Why have we created this site?

So that no one should ever be able to say he hasn't got enough information to make an intelligent decision. We believe that we've presented enough facts — whether through original documents, full quotations from candid insider sources, or thoughts and letters of talmidei chachomim who are familiar with the situation — that anyone, after having carefully read through the material, can comfortably draw his own conclusions. Those conclusions may be different from ours, but at least they'll be informed.

We also believe that the problem is serious enough to require action — and that precious little action has yet been taken. This will all become clear as you read through the material on this site.

Now is probably a good time to acknowledge a difficulty that any discussion of Chabad will inescapably encounter: there is no hard demographic evidence proving how many or how few Lubavitchers hold unacceptable beliefs. Any evidence we are going to present is, by the very nature of the argument, going to be circumstantial. What's important, though, is for us to employ a transparency of method that allows our readers to retrace the trail of evidence and to intelligently judge for themselves.

"But hasn't Chabad accomplished so much for Klal Yisroel?"

We, the people of the Torah, believe in a G-d Who knows all, remembers all, and withholds due reward from no creature, no matter how humble. If a community has accomplished something of value, we needn't worry about its place in G-d's universe: G-d Himself can handle these matters quite well. In fact, it's really none of our business.

Our job is to protect and perpetuate His perfect Torah and to transmit it unchanged to our children. If corrupted beliefs and practices have found their way into the Chabad community and are already quickly spreading beyond their borders, passivity isn't an option.

But why should we care? Why not just let them alone?

• Because these are our beloved brothers and sisters. If they, as a community, have become confused about central Torah values, we dare not abandon them to their plight. How can we intelligently and productively reach out to the open-minded among them — and to those now considering joining their movement — if we don't even understand how they think? If the reports of cult-like social pressures being exerted against Lubavitchers trying to leave turn out to be true, how can we not offer at least minimal resources and sympathy in support of those who fight?
• Because their teachers are among those educating our children in mainstream frum schools in nearly every city in North America. What is their curriculum?
• Because their shochtim are entrusted with the delicate and precise task of producing kosher meat in greater numbers than any other group, and their sofrim are producing significant numbers of sifrei Torah, tefillin, and mezuzos. What are their kavanos?
• Because their rabbis are leading shuls and guiding and staffing influential kashrus agencies throughout the world. What are the consequences?
• Because their ideology is false, and our own silence on the subject communicates a very strange message to our children and to the rest of the world.

A note on hatred

We have long noted how Lubavitchers often respond to even the mildest and most balanced criticism with the charge of sinas chinum. This is true no matter how objective or even friendly the tone of any letter or book on the subject. This is also true regardless of the lack of any evidence of actual bad feeling. It has, unfortunately, become utterly predictable that the principal reactions to any suggestion that there might be problems in Chabad ideology or practice consist of deeply emotional (and often incoherent) accusations of personal hatred and venom.

This is a real shame, because it makes it virtually impossible for anyone to engage in intelligent and productive dialogue on the issues that really matter.

But why is it so? We have some idea, but feel that this isn't the place to discuss it. Rather, we only request that any Lubavitchers among our readers who feel driven to react to this material should do so in the calm, scholarly spirit of its creation — and address only matters of true substance. If we've erred or omitted what's important, please do let us know.

Start exploring

There are many, many worrisome beliefs and practices common to the contemporary Lubavitch community. Some stand in serious conflict with halacha; others are simply odd. However, we're going to ignore most of them and focus primarily on the principle of hiskashrus — a Lubavitcher's attachment to his rebbe.

Why? Because hiskashrus isn't just odd or in conflict with any particular halacha. It would, as we shall soon demonstrate, seem to be minus — a corrupted understanding of G-d and His nature which, among other things, renders the believer unfit to provide religious services. And because hiskashrus is so central a part of modern Chabad, and is a theme so often repeated in their literature at every level, no one could ever claim "it's just a few crazy people at the fringe of the movement."

Hiskashrus, in fact, is the movement.

Exactly what is hiskashrus — and why is it a problem?

Central to the hiskashrus system is the elevation of a "tzadik" to super-human dimensions. If this tzadik somehow possesses powers and holiness that transcend normal human limitations, Lubavitchers are taught, then a chassid who connects with him can share in, or benefit from, those powers.

Here's how the Lubavitcher Rebbe, Menachem Mendel — referring to his deceased father-in-law as "the Rebbe" — described hiskashrus:

"A person must, from time to time, think about himself and his position and situation, but the rest of the time it's better to think about the Rebbe, how he is constantly with his mekusharim and how he leads them through every step. And this thought alone, even without any especially deep thought, should strengthen all one's kochos ha'nefesh so that they are used in accordance with the will of the Rebbe…

"And lest thoughts that are opposite to this occur to you, you need to know that this is the atzas ha'yetzer who seeks various ways to confuse you from (learning and performing) Torah and avoda. From this it is apparent that you must be strong in your trust in the brachos of the tzadik, the Rebbe, who stands by you and leads you on the right path… and the main thing is that it should be absolute and obvious that the Rebbe is with you, and you can rely on him that everything will be good, because atzmus u'mehus ein sof boruch hu is the ultimate good, and the Rebbe is the memutza ha'mechaber with atzmus u'mehus ein sof boruch hu, and firt durch dem ratzon so it will all be good and ultimately it should be (a) visible and revealed good…" Igros Kodesh, vol. 3, pp. 419–420 · original p. 419 · original p. 420

So hiskashrus allows — or even requires — that a chossid think constantly about his rebbe, even a rebbe who has already died. And from those thoughts, he can be confident that this dead rebbe can both guide him and ensure that everything will be fine.

Does this belief lead to practical applications?

The Rebbe's defining sicha from the last day of Pesach, 5710 (printed in Likutei Sichos vol. 2, pp. 510–511 — see the originals here and here) seems to indicate that there are.

The Rebbe asked the following question: "How can one (make a) request (of) ['betten'] a rebbe; isn't that (a problem of speaking to HaShem through) an intermediary?" With the word "intermediary," he was acknowledging the Rambam's fifth category of minus (Hilchos Teshuva 3:7). After a number of explanatory paragraphs, the sicha confirms that it is indeed permitted to "betten" a rebbe, and that:

"One can't ask a question from the problem of intermediary, since this is the essence and existence (of HaShem that HaShem has) enveloped in a body." ["Atzmus u'mehus alein vi er hat zich areingeshtalt in a guf"]

"…The rebbe is with us still as before; he is in this room just as before, and he hears what we are farbrengen here. Once, the rebbe switched on the microphone in his room and heard us farbrengen here. Now, it is the same — only much more." Likutei Sichos vol. 2, pp. 510–511 · Acharon shel Pesach 5710

These words reveal a number of beliefs. One, that a chassid may request all manner of assistance from his rebbe — even a rebbe who has died — in a way that Jews have always believed appropriate only from HaShem. Two, that the rebbe can hear these requests, even though he (or his body) is distant from the petitioner; in other words, that he is effectively omniscient. Three, that the rebbe is able to respond to these requests; in other words, that he is omnipotent — why should anyone daven to someone who can't help?

It must be noted that the above sicha was delivered in the period between the death of the previous rebbe (the Riyatz) and the appointment of his successor, Menachem Mendel. There can be no doubt that the leaders and educators of the movement were well aware of these teachings when they offered him the position (over the vigorous candidacy of his brother-in-law) some months later, in Shevat 5711. One can only conclude that they, too, accepted the legitimacy of "atzmus theology." These leaders and their students have taught and guided the movement ever since.

Around this time, the Lubavitcher Rebbe published another, even more frightening formulation in Toras Menachem (vol. 1, pp. 162–163 — see the originals here and here). He was addressing the accepted historical opposition to the study of kabbala among individuals who were not thoroughly prepared in advance. Today, he wrote, one simply can't wait until he is prepared; he may nevertheless study the "rebbe's Toras chassidus," relying on his relationship with the rebbe to carry him. This relationship will not only work for his full-fledged followers,

"…but even if a person is found to still harbor doubts about the rebbe (whether he controls everything and is all-powerful and thus is impossible to hide from), he should still study the rebbe's chassidus…" Toras Menachem, vol. 1, pp. 162–163

So, if we are to take the Lubavitcher Rebbe's word for it, he is not only effectively omniscient, but omnipotent too — a veritable god!

A two-way street

Hiskashrus would seem to be a two-way street: not only should a Lubavitcher develop a strong sense of emotional attachment with his (dead) rebbe, but that attachment will arouse the rebbe to provide the chassid's needs.

"We will merit to have the rebbe (the Riyatz) here, below, in a body, below ten (tefachim), and he will redeem us." Basi L'gani · 10 Shevat 5711

"Even now, the rebbe stands and guides all matters." Beis Chelakim, from hisva'adus · 12 Tammuz 5711

Is this actually taught and practiced today?

Now, of course, just demonstrating that the rebbe believed and wrote about these ideas doesn't prove that they are actually taught and practiced among his contemporary followers — which is our true concern. There are, however, some readily available samples that should give us some indication.

During the dark days of the Mumbai Massacre, Rabbi Shlomo Cunin — among the most prominent and powerful rabbis in the entire Chabad movement — was recorded on video (watch it here) declaring his confidence that all the remaining hostages would be released, and that then, "they will understand and see it's the rebbe who runs this world." Rabbi Cunin didn't make this up. He quoted virtually word for word from Likutei Sichos, Shabbos parashas Teruma, parashas Zachor, 8 Adar 5710.

Here's a brief excerpt taken from a teaching resource — aimed at first- to fourth-grade children — published by the well-known Chabad educational organization Tzivos Hashem, in a pamphlet imaginatively entitled "The Rebbe":

"…Whenever we learn a Sicha or a Maamar we become very close and connected to our Rebbe." Tzivos Hashem teaching pamphlet, "The Rebbe"

Beis Moshiach magazine

In general, it must be acknowledged that the Chabad magazine Beis Moshiach has been widely and publicly criticized — and even banned — by some Lubavitch rabbis. Nevertheless, it's rare to see or hear Lubavitchers disagreeing with the actual beliefs the editors promote; just with their decision to publish in such a public forum. More importantly, many of the magazine's writers hold positions of great influence in Chabad educational establishments. After all, if a community hires and supports such people as educators of their children, one should assume that the community is comfortable with their basic beliefs.

"When you relate to the Rebbe as someone from the past, he becomes, r'l, part of history. The difference between the Rebbe and other tzaddikim, especially the other Rebbeim, becomes blurred. The miracles the Rebbe continues to perform, etc., alone do not sufficiently underscore the fact that the Rebbe is our Nasi, now as before." Beis Moshiach, Issue 299 · "Wisdom From Our Mashpiim," quoting Rabbi Levi Yitzchok Ginsberg, mashpia, Tomchei Tmimim, Kfar Chabad

"In order to daven, the person has to be infused with the concept that the Rebbe is the one who is the 'connecting intermediary.'" Beis Moshiach, Issue 320 · Rabbi Sholom Charitonov, mashpia, Oholei Torah

"I felt the Rebbe's presence not only then, but all along the way. I felt that not only was the Rebbe guiding me, but that he was making it all happen." Beis Moshiach, Issue 379 · "We Can Still Turn to the Rebbe," Rabbi Aviad Disraeli

What about Chabad summer camps?

Here's something from an individual who was a counselor and teacher at Camp Gan Yisroel of Montreal, Camp Gan Yisroel of Parksville NY, and Camp Gan Yisroel of Los Angeles — describing a song sung with the children every day:

The Rebbe is, the Rebbe lives,
The Rebbe cares, the Rebbe hears,
The Rebbe sees, the Rebbe leads,
He is concerned for all our needs.
The Rebbe is, the Rebbe gives,
The Rebbe sees, the Rebbe speaks,
The Rebbe smiles… Daily camp song · Camp Gan Yisroel (Montreal, Parksville, Los Angeles)

And from Horizons magazine (Winter '97–'98, No. 15, p. 131), a description by Leah Lipszyc — the wife of a prominent Chabad shaliach — of her experience facing the extended armed robbery of her home in Ukraine:

"Rebbe," I thought. "I know you're here with us. I know you help people in difficult situations. I think this fits the criteria — please help us now. And do it quickly, please, before one of these guys snaps and decides to shoot." Horizons Magazine, Winter '97–'98, No. 15, p. 131

By the way, we are still dismayed that a mainstream Orthodox magazine like Horizons would publish, without comment, this autobiographical account of a woman actually davening to her dead rebbe.

Has the message been picked up by the students?

So the rebbe wrote and spoke about it, and for the past fifty years there have been teachers and mashpiim faithfully transmitting it. But has the message of hiskashrus been picked up by their students? Yes. Without a doubt. It would simply be unthinkable for any Lubavitcher to reject any of his rebbe's established teachings.

It could, perhaps, be argued that since the rebbe published so many volumes of writings, many people might simply be unaware of this particular thought — perhaps it was "lost in the crowd." Perhaps such a thing could be argued, but it's just not true. As we said above, hiskashrus is universally known and is inseparable from modern Chabad.

Here's an example from a Chabad-dominated online forum based in Montreal. The question starting off this particular thread was: "What do you do to instill hiskashrus to the Rebbe in your children?" Among the responses (each from a different poster — and remember, this is one of the smaller online forums where Lubavitchers meet):

"We have a picture of the Rebbe in every room of the house. And we point at it and ask 'Who is that?' often. Pictures of the Rebbetzin and the Rebbe's parents abound, as well as posters of the previous Rabbeim. We discuss sichos at every Shabbos and Yom Tov meal, and specify that it is a teaching of the Rebbe. We tell our children: YOU are the Rebbe's children… Basically, we include the Rebbe and Rabbeim in everyday conversation, the way we talk about family members." Forum poster #1

"…When they hear their Rebbe talking to them in Yiddish (on a tape, video, i"yh Moshiach…) they will be able to understand the Rebbe clearly… pictures of Rebbeim in the house and in their room so that they become familiar faces… to name the children after the Rebbeim / Rebbetzins or great chassidim, so they feel a basic connection already… in some families each child has a 'Rebbe album' of their own." Forum poster #2

"In the Ha'Yom Yom for Elul 10, it says that the gedolei ziknei chasidei Rabeinu Ha'Zakein said that one of the purposes of a yechidus is: l'hiskasher b'hisachdus gemura, v'limsor atzmo — he should bind himself to the Rebbe in total oneness, and give himself over with all his desires… The longing for hiskashrus can only be satisfied when you learn maamarei Chassidus… seeing him is not enough." Forum poster #3, citing Ha'Yom Yom (Elul 10, 24 Sivan, 9 Adar II, 8 Iyar)

"We can posit different levels of Hiskashrus: 1. People who are truly bonded to the Rebbe and sense this deep attachment. 2. Those who are pained that they don't feel mekusher and have the deep desire to attach themselves to the Rebbe. 3. Those who are distressed because they do not even have the desire to be mekusher. 4. Those who are troubled by the fact that they are not distressed by the fact that they feel no desire to be mekusher — and so on…" Forum poster #5, on Yud Shevat preparation

We will soon present evidence that these beliefs represent a significant departure from halachic Judaism — although we are greatly pained that evidence should be necessary. It should be understood, though, that some Lubavitchers (largely in response to persistent criticism from a few Orthodox individuals) have offered various arguments in defense of hiskashrus. These arguments, and our reaction to them, are presented in the book.

For an extended dialogue concerning this site, initiated by a Lubavitcher, see this exchange.

The Rambam (Hilchos Teshuva 3:7) writes:

"Five (types of people) are called minim: one who says that there's no G-d and the world has no director; one who says that there is a director, but there are two or more; one who says that there is one Master, but He has a body or image; also one who says that He wasn't uniquely alone (when He) created everything; and also one who serves G-d and another besides, in order to act as an intermediary (meilitz) between him and the Master of all worlds." Rambam, Hilchos Teshuva 3:7

The Ra'avad, however, argues that one who visualizes HaShem in physical terms shouldn't be considered a min, as he was most likely simply confused by subtle passages in Tanach or midrashim. It would seem, according to the Ra'avad, that adopting improper beliefs through honest error would not give a Jew the status of min. How are we to understand this debate?

The Chazon Ish

Perhaps surprisingly, the Chazon Ish (Hilchos Akum 62:21) suggests ("efshar") that even the Rambam would agree that a Jew is not a min if, through honest ignorance, and thinking his beliefs conform to Torah tradition, he believes HaShem has physical properties. Conversely, the Chazon Ish also proposes that the Ra'avad would label as a min someone who understands that the Torah doesn't allow for belief in a physical god, yet who nevertheless ascribes the creation of the world to physical beings.

If this is correct — and assuming the Chazon Ish even meant it as a halachic statement — then one could say that most Lubavitchers (and, indeed, most secular Jews) cannot be considered minim, but kosher, albeit confused, Jews.

However, for various reasons, we're not at all sure that the Chazon Ish intended these ideas to be applied in halacha. For one thing, we don't think it's possible to apply both suggestions at the same time, as that would seem to require that the Rambam and Ra'avad agree on all points — and we don't know anyone who would be comfortable reading it that way.

In addition, the Rambam himself, in Moreh Nevuchim (end of section 1, chapter 36), clearly explains his opinion:

"If you think that there is an excuse for those who believe in the corporeality of G-d on the ground of their training (i.e., background), their ignorance, or their defective comprehension, you must (then) make the same concession to the (actual) worshippers of idols; (after all) their worship is (also) due to ignorance or to early training (see Chullin 13a)… There is no excuse whatever for those who, being unable to think for themselves, do not accept (G-d's incorporeality)…" Rambam, Moreh Nevuchim I:36

R' Elchonon Wasserman

This is the best-known treatment of the subject. In Kovetz Ma'amorim, R' Elchonon quotes R' Chaim Brisker's explanation of the Rambam. Since emunah is an absolute requirement for "membership" in Klal Yisrael, lack of emunah — resulting from any cause at all — qualifies as minus. The Ra'avad argues that belief in a god with physical qualities can be the result of a person's reliance on what he perceives as the correct meaning of the complicated seforim he has read. The Rambam, according to R' Elchonon, would counter that, had the person really wanted to believe, he would have found proper explanations for those complex passages — and that it therefore all really comes down to personal choice.

According to this approach — which, though it wasn't necessarily said in a purely halachic context, certainly can't be ignored — we are left with an unresolved machlokes on a matter d'oraisa.

R' Samson Raphael Hirsch

As part of his monumental exchange of letters with R' Seligman Bamberger (the Wurtzburger Rav) on the subject of secession, Rabbi Hirsch offered a precise and thorough definition of minus. The approach R' Hirsch chose formed the foundation of his halachic opinion that, given the choice, a loyal Jew is clearly obligated by halacha to separate from a kehilla dominated by Reformers. The source for much of this presentation is the English edition of Hirsch's Collected Writings, Volume VI, particularly pages 277–301 (extensive excerpts can be found in Hebrew in Shemesh Marpe, shu"t 46).

R' Hirsch notes that a mumar is someone who, for one reason or another, "subscribes in practice to ideas contrary to Judaism" — he simply desecrates Shabbos. A min, however, "subscribes to such views (also) in thought and attitude" — he feels it's the correct thing to do. This is what is meant by "aduk" (see, for instance, Chulin 13b, Rashi "min"): he is attached to his theology; his whole personality is defined by it in principle.

Further, it makes no difference whether the min observes other mitzvos and/or considers himself a loyal Jew (even if he is a child of minim): his principled defection in a crucial area of the Torah testifies to his self-exclusion from the Torah nation. We are, therefore, required to distance ourselves from him, regardless of his general level of observance or warmth to Judaism (see Avodah Zarah 17a on Mishlei 5:8).

As proof, R' Hirsch quotes the Rambam (Avodah Zarah 2:5):

"And also the Jewish minim are not like Jews for any matter at all… and the minim foolishly err after the thoughts of their hearts in those areas we've discussed." Rambam, Hilchos Avodah Zarah 2:5

The Rambam here ("in those areas we've discussed") refers to a previous halacha (A"Z 2:3), where he had described the many intellectual and theological inquiries that could lead a person to minus: "Sometimes he will explore avodah zarah and sometimes Unity; maybe He exists, maybe He doesn't; what's above, what's below… sometimes (he'll explore the possibility that) nevuah is authentic, sometimes that it isn't…" And to where, writes the Rambam, do these inquiries ultimately lead?

"…until they end up transgressing essential elements of the Torah in spite and with impunity, and they say: 'there is in this no sin.'" Rambam, Hilchos Avodah Zarah 2:3

This is the Rambam's definition of minus. A person who embarked upon a journey of investigation into Torah principles and who came — perhaps in all honesty — to the wrong conclusions ("they say: 'there isn't in this any sin'")… he is a min! He "lacks the status of 'Jew' in every respect!"

Remember R' Hirsch's principle: minus is attitude, not practice. We're not worried that he might transform some medicine or sefer Torah into a tool for avodah zarah; we're worried that he might leave his impression upon us ("shani minus d'mashcha"). And this, says R' Hirsch, we see in the final words of the Rambam himself: "u'machsheves min l'avodah zarah." Note: it doesn't say "stam machshavos…" — which would imply that we're worried that, say, at the moment of a min's shechita he was thinking about his gods. Rather, it's that the attitude of a min is naturally and constantly drawn to his philosophy of defection.

And, adds R' Hirsch (among other proofs), it must be thus: otherwise, how would you explain Tzadok and Baysus? They reached their conclusions based on a misunderstanding of their rebbi's Torah — and would anyone argue that they are not minim (see, for instance, the Aruch brought by Rashi to Avos 1:3)?

So the opinion of the Rambam lies before us. But what about the aforementioned Ra'avad in Hilchos Teshuva? R' Hirsch observes that the Ra'avad says nothing about our Rambam in Hilchos Avodah Zarah. But if he truly held that minus reached through honest error wasn't minus, shouldn't he have noted his opinion where the Rambam attests to the contrary so clearly? Rather, writes R' Hirsch, it would seem that the Ra'avad agrees with the Rambam everywhere except in the third category from Hilchos Teshuva, which "refers only to the misconception of the essence of G-d, an error that is purely metaphysical, without any relevance to the practice of Jewish devotion to duty."

At most, then, the Ra'avad — and only the Ra'avad — might consider a Jew who associates his rebbe with HaShem as a "min in error." But even he would agree that davening to a rebbe, or ascribing to one's rebbe any quality of infiniteness (or, for that matter, thinking him a navi on the level of Moshe), is full heresy in all its horror.

Is davening to a human being actually avodah zarah?

Amazing as it might sound, we've actually encountered individuals who weren't sure. So let's look at the evidence.

The Nefesh Hachaim (R' Chaim m'Volozhin), Sha'ar 3, ch. 9, writes that not only is it prohibited to worship or serve any force or creature besides G-d — it is equally forbidden to worship that which is godly in a human being. One may not, therefore, pray to the Divine spirit (ruach hakodesh) that may rest on a prophet or holy man.

A source for this prohibition can be seen in the book of Daniel where, having heard his dream successfully described and interpreted, Nevuchadnezer "fell on his face, bowed to Daniel and expressed a desire to offer a libation to him, saying: 'it is true that your G-d is the G-d of gods Who guides kings and reveals secrets…'"

It is clear, observes R' Chaim, that Nevuchadnezer didn't think Daniel himself was G-d. Rather, he wanted to venerate that manifestation of G-dliness that Daniel had demonstrated through his inspired interpretation. Yet Daniel refused to allow the offering and, according to the gemara (Sanhedrin 93a), considered the act idolatrous — and himself the involuntary object of avodah zarah, presumably because the king had bowed.

Similarly, R' Chaim notes that Yaakov sought to be buried outside of Egypt, fearing that the Egyptians would venerate him (see Rashi to Bereishis 47:29). Even though the Egyptians' intention would have been the worship of what was G-dly within Yaakov — and not of Yaakov himself — the act was still considered idolatrous. R' Chaim adds:

"…Even though the primary prohibited act of idolatry is through one of the four paradigm acts of worship [animal sacrifice, incense, libation, and bowing], nevertheless, now that worship through prayer (accompanied by hishtabdus halev) stands in the place of sacrifice, it [i.e., prayer directed anywhere but towards G-d] is certainly idolatry." Nefesh Hachaim, Sha'ar 3, ch. 9

So praying to any man, living or dead — even to the ruach hakodesh within a man — is idolatrous.

What conclusions can we safely draw?

That, even if we focus on nothing but the writings of the Alter Rebbe and the Rebbe, Menachem Mendel, there are enough problems to seriously consider reassessing the kashrus of the movement's ideology. And, further, that these beliefs have been successfully transmitted to at least some in Chabad's current generation.

But so what? Both the Alter Rebbe and his distant descendant are now dead, and we've only seen relevant quotations from a handful of his followers. Is there any proof that all, or at least most, modern Lubavitchers are minim — i.e., that they daven to their rebbe and/or consider him synonymous with G-d?

Well, it's certainly true that there is no clear demographic information on the subject. But, bearing in mind the fierce loyalty and adoration demonstrated uniformly by all Lubavitchers for their rebbe — and the broad and profound familiarity they all have with his writings — it's hard to imagine that any of them would reject an established teaching that lies so close to the center of his whole theological system. And if a Lubavitcher would reject it — knowing its true meaning and implications — wouldn't he leave the movement altogether?

If, then, a Lubavitcher still expresses loyalty to his rebbe, we can't imagine how it could be interpreted in any way but that he's a min. Prove us wrong.

For a fuller review of the main halachic arguments that shape Orthodox Judaism's response to the problem, see the summary PDF.

Walking up to your Lubavitcher neighbor and asking him whether he davens to his dead rabbi is about as useful as asking a used-car salesman whether the sticker price is a good deal. Just what do you think he's going to say?

Even if he would acknowledge to himself that he does daven, he can easily justify hiding the information from you because, after all, he doesn't really "daven" — he is, instead, "betten" or, even better, involved in "hiskashrus."

Similarly, don't expect reliable results from questions like "do you believe the rebbe is Moshiach?" Which normal Lubavitcher would put his job or reputation on the line by admitting that to a misnagid? If he's worried about the consequences, he, too, will say "no" — while thinking to himself, "sure, he might not be Moshiach yet, but he will soon," or "I don't believe he's Moshiach, I know he is." Ditto for "is your rebbe still alive?"

And who can blame them for being evasive? They know what's at stake and what has to be done to avoid bad PR — just like a mechanech in a yeshiva ketana knows to skip certain sensitive Rashis when teaching lower grades. Those kids aren't ready for it yet. It's called self-censorship, and everyone does it.

First: be clear about what you want to find out, and why

If you're interviewing someone to know whether he's fit to provide you with shechita or STaM (or to handle your wine, etc.), his attitude toward hiskashrus is probably the best indicator. If you want to know whether, let's say, his summer day camp or school is appropriate for your child, you will probably also want to know if he's going to be teaching about his "Moshiach."

Testing for hiskashrus

We would suggest that unless your Lubavitcher is willing to admit that the sicha is forbidden to follow (and that the rebbe was badly mistaken), he's probably a card-carrying min. If he does admit it — using language like "yes, that's always bothered me, too" — then you might ask him why he's still part of a movement that so widely teaches such things… and why, if he admits that it's wrong, he encourages other Jews (including his own children) to live such a lifestyle?

Now what about messianism?

This one's easier. Ask your Lubavitcher whether it's impossible for Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, after his petira, to be Moshiach — and that Moshiach will therefore have to be someone else.

• If he replies, "well, you can't say it's absolutely impossible…" — then you can be confident he's a believer.
• If he answers, "we don't like to point fingers; we only want Moshiach to come soon, whoever he is" — then he's being evasive. He hasn't answered your question at all, and you have a right to wonder why.

We believe it's unfortunate, but absolutely essential, that modern Lubavitchers hoping to provide religious services to frum Jews be subjected to such an examination. But even if you go to the trouble of questioning him (or her), make sure that you do it properly — and don't simply add to the clouds of confusion already swirling around our nation.

Just how widespread is the Chabad belief that their rebbe "runs the world" — and that, even after his death, he responds to the prayers of those who believe in him? Now, more than ever before, we can answer that question.

In November 2011, the main banquet of the annual Kinus Hashluchim — an annual gathering for professional Chabad emissaries from around the world — took place at the Brooklyn Cruise Terminal. Rabbi Moshe Kotlarsky hosted the event, addressing the 5,000 attending shluchim. In the course of his remarks, he offered this blessing:

"May the Rebbe look upon our gathering favorably; his presence is here with us now, and may he grant our requests." Rabbi Moshe Kotlarsky · Kinus Hashluchim banquet, November 2011

It was an assembly of no fewer than 5,000 of the most respected and mainstream individuals Lubavitch has. This, inarguably, was the very core of the modern movement. And before this audience — without a single noticeable word or act of protest in response — a significant leading figure clearly identified their departed rebbe, rather than G-d, as the one who has the power to grant the requests offered through human prayer.

Even if one will argue that some of those present rejected this formulation but nevertheless remained silent, their failure to register any protest means either that they don't consider the issue important enough to get involved, or that they are intimidated by the overwhelming majority of their colleagues who accept the belief. Either way, the conclusions we may now draw are clear.

Tracing the evolution of our awareness

Years ago, we demonstrated that Lubavitchers were educated through official Chabad sources to treat their deceased rebbe like a god: to pray to him, to constantly think about his powerful, all-knowing presence, and to ascribe great world events to his influence.

We can all observe the intense and universal loyalty Lubavitchers have for their rebbe's teachings, among which the above principles are included. But many people still refused to believe that the same Lubavitchers who act as Torah educators, shochtim, sofrim, and simple, kind, decent neighbors also share this theology — and that their theology affects their ability to live as kosher Jews. Somehow, it was widely assumed, "normal" Lubavitchers don't actually listen to their rebbe's teachings on this subject.

When it was pointed out that some Lubavitchers referred to their rebbe as "boreinu" (our Creator), the Orthodox mainstream barely noticed — justifiably considering it the work of "just a few lunatics from Tzfas."

Similarly, Leah Lipszyc — the wife of a prominent Chabad shaliach — once described her reaction to a difficult experience by recounting how she turned in thought to the deceased rebbe and asked him directly for help and rescue. Where was this account published? In the non-Chabad Horizons Magazine (Winter '97–'98, No. 15, p. 131). But Mrs. Lipszyc, too, is only one woman — and the publishers of Horizons aren't even Lubavitchers.

Later, it became apparent that a number of Lubavitch print publications and websites, from various locations around the world, regularly encourage a rebbe–chassid relationship along the lines of the most problematic of the teachings we've described. That, too, was dismissed as the work of a vocal but unrepresentative minority — people living at the fringe of Chabad whose words are largely ignored by the official mainstream population.

Later still, in late 2008, a video surfaced showing one of Chabad's most powerful and respected shluchim describing how everyone will soon see that "it's the rebbe who runs the world." There is no evidence that this rabbi was ever criticized within Chabad for what he said — after all, wasn't he only quoting his rebbe's words (see שיחת ש"פ תרומה, פ' זכור, ח' אדר, ה'שי"ת)? On the contrary, the fact that the Internet was filled with attempts to rationalize the message says quite a lot about mainstream Chabad's current mindset.

At around the same time, Rabbi Mordechai Shmuel Ashkenazi spoke before thousands of Jews at a memorial gathering for the victims of the tragic Mumbai massacres. As widely reported, his address included these words:

"הם נטבחו ממש כמו במעשי הצלב, כמו פרעות ת"ח ות"ט עם תשמישי הקדושה בידיהם. הם הזדככו בצורה כזאת שאף אחד מישראל לא זוכה לזה. הם יגיעו תיכף ומיד למחיצתו של הרבי. הם יצעקו ויזעקו בפניו: רבי, תציל ותגן על כל אחד ואחד מהשלוחים במקומו, שלא יהיה להם כל נזק." Rabbi Mordechai Shmuel Ashkenazi · Mumbai memorial gathering (via shturem.net)

"They were slaughtered just as in the Crusades, with their holy vessels in hand, like in the massacres of tach v'tat. They were purified in a way that no other Jew merited. They will immediately reach the rebbe's presence. They will cry before him: Rebbe! Save and protect each and every one of the shluchim wherever he is, so that he should come to no harm." English translation

Yet despite the video's wide dissemination — and the fact that Rabbi Ashkenazi's speech was no secret — they too sparked little practical change. "After all," one could reassure himself, "it was just one or two men."

Still, we were told, the elite core within modern Lubavitch — the shluchim — were as a group highly educated and pure and clean in their beliefs. These are the people who teach Torah to the children of both Chabad and other Jewish communities, and what they believe and teach is beyond reproach. Whatever problems might exist at the fringes of the movement surely don't affect the vast majority of these dedicated shluchim.

But now we know better. Now there is no excuse for a Jewish public policy that does not responsibly take this deviation into account.

Olomeinu teaches Lubavitch theology? We can imagine no better example of just how deeply Chabad's ideological errors have penetrated into mainstream Orthodox Judaism than the February 2009 edition of the popular and venerable children's magazine, Olomeinu.

The following letter, sent to the magazine's office at the time, should adequately illustrate the issue. Despite the expressed outrage of at least one of America's leading roshei yeshivos, no substantial response or retraction was apparently ever issued by the magazine's editors or management. They seem entirely unmoved by the problem. (Compare this article to an accurate and sophisticated description of the Thirteen Principles printed by Olomeinu in their February 1969 issue, and see how confused mainstream Orthodox Judaism has become in just forty years.)

The letter

Hello,

My children recently received this month's edition of Olomeinu, and I was struck by what I consider a number of oversights in the section on Rambam's 13 principles. Please allow me to share my observations with you. You wrote:

"Hashem doesn't have a body, but He is everywhere" … "He is everywhere and in everyone… He is in the water and in the air…" Olomeinu, February 2009

This belief is not only the precise opposite of what the Rambam himself wrote in his ikkarim, but it is a variation of neo-Spinozian pantheism — and most likely a category of minus as defined by Rambam in Hilchos Teshuva 3:7!

Rambam (in his 13 principles) very clearly states that Hashem's unity requires that He is internally indivisible. That means one cannot ascribe to Him any attribute (baal chessed, baal rachamim, etc.) without "creating" a unity-negating division. One could most certainly not imagine that Hashem is somehow "within" anything corporeal — like a human body — without invoking a very serious division. Therefore, claiming that Hashem somehow resides "within us" is an incarnationism that would seem to directly negate Rambam's third principle, or at the very least come dangerously close!

Your suggestion that Hashem is somehow "everywhere and in everything" is in fact far closer to pantheism — for the teaching of which Baruch Spinoza was expelled from the Amsterdam kehilla — and is an idea very far from the Rambam's Torah philosophy.

Practically, I certainly haven't the authority (or chutzpa) to demand that you present only the Rambam's words in any given matter of emunah or halacha — and if you can find legitimate sources to support your own approach, I would voice no complaint. But I do feel that presenting beliefs against which the Rambam fought as though they were his own is wrong, and could potentially have serious consequences for the emunas Hashem of tens of thousands of Orthodox children.

Next, your words —

"All the nevi'im's words are true, and I have emunas chachomim, too…" Olomeinu, February 2009

— are, besides being absent from the Rambam's 13 ikkarim, potentially misleading. There is, to my knowledge, no source anywhere in classical Torah literature suggesting that our chachomim are or were ever infallible. Even Moshe Rabbeinu himself was recorded by the Torah as making mistakes (see, for instance, Vayikra 10:19). Such close comparison between our faith in the infallibility of nevuah and the way we relate to our rabbonim carries the potential for great confusion and disillusionment. And it's incorrect.

Emunas chachomim, at least the way I learned it from my own rebbeim, is the belief that chachomim are simply smarter and — because of their great amailus and zechuyos — are far more likely to be correct than I am. In a dispute, a wise talmid will always defer to chachomim. But he will never reject at least the theoretical possibility that they could be wrong.

Finally, as a general (and relatively minor) point: the thirteen "ani maamin's" printed in many siddurim are most certainly not representative of the Rambam's own thoughts on this matter — which, of course, can be found in his commentary to the mishnayos of the final perek of Sanhedrin. At most, the "ani maamin's" bear only a superficial resemblance. In that light, attributing to Rambam's formulation of the 13 principles such phrases as —

"Hashem is constantly guiding the world and caring for everything that is in it" … "We must turn to Hashem for everything… Hashem does not always do what we ask for, but He always does what's best for us" Olomeinu, February 2009

— is incorrect and misleading. That's not to say that these aren't important and correct beliefs, or that the Rambam would disagree with them; but he clearly didn't consider them "ikkarim," and implying otherwise would seem to be bad chinuch.

With regards…

These letters and published responses — from some of the most senior Torah authorities of the past generations — document how gedolei Torah outside the movement have assessed the problem. The originals are linked below; an internet connection is required to open them.

Full-length Hebrew texts

Face to face — dialogues

Video & off-site evidence

Original document scans

The companion book

Contact

Questions, corrections, or matters of true substance: identifyingchabad@gmail.com. If we've erred or omitted what's important, please do let us know.